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Abstract
This article describes a new family of cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generators, based on coupled chaotic maps,
that will serve as keystream in a stream cipher. The maps are a
modification of a piecewise linear map, by dynamic changing of the
coefficient values and perturbing its lesser significant bits.
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1 Introduction
A Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is an essential building
block with many applications, including test data generation, Monte
Carlo simulation techniques, spread spectrum communications, to name a
few. But they are an essential part of any cryptosystem because of the
security of many cryptographic systems depends on the generation of good
pseudorandom sequences. The generated numbers will be used mainly as
keystreams, initial vectors, private keys, and private signatures, destined
to control or initialize cryptographic algorithms. However, the design of
reliable pseudorandom generators remains an open problem in cryptology.
Some de facto standards that regarded as secure in the past have recently
failed [1, 2, 3, 4], other generators such as the BBS generator —which is
one of the few PRNGs with proven security [5]— are of little use for its
slowness.
In 2000, the NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity
and Encryption) project, was launched in Europe, as an open call, for
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the submission of cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, all six stream
ciphers submitted failed against cryptanalysis. In 2004, the eSTREAM
project was launched as part of ECRYPT (European Network of Excellence
in Cryptology). eSTREAM issued a call for stream cipher primitives. As
a result, in 2008 seven finalists where pre selected (four in software and 3
in hardware), but currently it has not yet been possible to decide which of
them deserves to be a standard.
The link between cryptography and chaotic systems continues to be an
active research field. Many researchers agree that the interaction of these
areas can be mutually beneficial. Many tools for analyzing chaotic systems
have also served as tools in cryptanalysis of many systems and for studying
and improving the design of others [6, 7, 8].
This paper presents a family of pseudo random number generators, that
consist of several coupled chaotic maps, mutually perturbed, that will serve
as keystream in a stream cipher.
2 Family of Pseudorandom Generators Based on
the Combination of Chaotic Maps
The proposed family of pseudorandom generators is based on the
combination of the sequences generated by several coupled basic
pseudorandom generators, through a one-way function. Each one consists
of a chaotic map, cryptographically secure itself, which has a high entropy.
Every map has a limited number of states, and therefore its period of
repetition is also limited; in agreement to the word length of the language
with which it is programmed, that in turn depends on the word length of
the hardware that is in use.
The combination of several sequences by a one-way function has two
aims. The first one is to increase the number of states of the system, with
the consequent increase of the period of the repetition, the increase of the
entropy, and the increase of the number of keys. The second objective is
to increase the security. Indeed, when mixing multiple streams so that the
size of the output word is less than the sum of the sizes of the input words,
it is extremely difficult to make an individualized analysis of the sequences
generated by each chaotic map and, hence, to mount a cryptanalytic attack.
The method of combination chosen consists of the bitwise XOR of the
numbers generated by several chaotic maps. The number of maps must be
chosen depending on the application and on the word length of the software
with which it is programmed.
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It was used a mixing of arithmetical operations and operations oriented
to bit, because this serves to avoid the purely algebraic attacks and the
purely bit oriented attacks. The mixing of a variety of operations, as
algebraic and bit manipulations, prevents the mathematical behavior of the
scheme from being shaped.
In addition, only very efficient operations are used: arithmetical
operations module the word size of the compiler, bitwise boolean operations,
and displacements of bits, all of them of easy implementation in hardware
or software. All these operations combined in the proposed generator
contribute to a great mathematical complexity together with a high
computational efficiency.
2.1 Chaotic Map With Dynamical Variation of Coefficients
and Perturbation of the Least Significant Bits
Assume there are one-dimensional chaotic maps F (xt, a, c, s) which consists
of the modification of a piecewise linear chaotic map by means of the
dynamic increase of coefficients and the perturbation of the least significant
bits of the samples, where {xt} denote the chaotic orbit and at, ct are the
control parameters of the system, which is defined by:
xt = (at xt−1 + ct) mod m⊕ ((at xt−1 + ct) mod m)≫ s, (1)
at = (at−1 +∆a) mod m, (2)
ct = (ct−1 +∆c) mod m, (3)
where t denotes the time; n is the number of bits of precision used; m = 2n
is the maximum number of values that xt can take ; at, ct are the coefficients
whose values suffer respectively an increase of ∆a,∆c with every iteration
of the system; x0, a0, c0 are the initial conditions; s is a constant 0 ≤ s ≤ n;
≫s is the right-shift operator in the C/C++ language, that is equivalent to
a division by 2s followed by the floor operation, i.e. y ≫ s = ⌊y/2s⌋.
The innovation of this chaotic map is that it comprises three interlinked
operations of different nature, the first one is a linear operation xt =
(at xt−1 + ct)mod m, peculiar to the algebraic pseudorandom generators,
while the second one is the bitwise XOR, and the third one is the right-shift
≫ s, both peculiar to the shift registers pseudorandom generators. The
coefficients at and ct are changed dynamically over time.
This map may be considered a modification of a sawtooth piecewise
linear map incorporating two novelties, the first one is the dynamical
increment of the coefficients, which hides any observable regularity; and
the second one is the perturbation of less significant bits attained by the
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Figure 1: Return map of the mapping xt = (5xt−1 + 1) mod m, with m =
216.
bitwise XOR addition of the right-shifted bits, with the aim of increasing
the entropy of the generated number sequence.
Drawing a two-dimensional graph of the points of the chaotic orbit {xt}
as a function of {xt−1}, yields the so-called return map function, which in
simple cases can reconstruct the value of the parameters of a chaotic orbit.
2.1.1 Plain Sawtooth Piecewise Linear Map
The simplest form of the generator takes place when ∆a = ∆c = 0 and
s = n. When s = n, Eq. (1) is reduced to xt = (at xt−1 + ct)mod m,
because a n bits right-shift of a number coded with n bits will be always
equal to zero. In such a case, the resulting map is a sawtooth piecewise
linear map which coincides with the lineal congruential generator, whose
lack of security is well known [9, 10].
The maximum value of the period p = m of the generated sequence, is
reached when a0 mod 4 = 1 and c0 mod 2 = 1 [9].
In this case the return map of the function of Eq. (1) is reduced to a
sawtooth, with so many steps as the value of a0 and with an ordinate at the
origin equal to c0. Figure 1 illustrates an example for a0 = 5, c0 = 1, and
m = 216.
The map for these parameter values is bijective, hence invertible, and
subject to algebraic cryptanalysis. It lacks security because the parameter
value may be deduced by inspection of the return map.
The entropy of the generated number sequence is very low, the lesser
significant bits of the numbers are not random; for instance, the sequence
of the least significant bit of the numbers, generated by the map of the
example of Fig. 1, is just {1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .}, the sequence of the second
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less significant bit is {1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . .}, and so on. Only the higher
significant bits can be considered random. This generator fails to pass most
of randomness test suites.
2.1.2 Sawtooth Piecewise Linear Map with Dynamical Variation
of Coefficients
The firs step toward a satisfactory level of security consists of the
modification of the map described in Sect. 2.1.1 by incrementing the value
of parameters at and ct at each iteration of the system, according to Eqs. (2)
and (3). The maximum value of the period p = m, of the generated sequence,
is reached when s = n, a0mod 4 = 1, ∆amod 4 = 0, c0mod 4 = 1, and ∆c
mod 4 = 0.
The corresponding return map is depicted in Fig. 2 (a), for a0 = 5,
∆a = 4, c0 = 1, ∆c = 4, s = n = 16 and m = 2
16. It can be observed
that the return map does not supply any information about the parameters
nor their increments; the number of points in it is the same as in Fig. 1
but they are scattered across the whole return map area. But the mapping
is still bijective and invertible, hence subject to algebraic cryptanalysis and
the improvement of security is limited.
xt
xt−1
(a)
xt
xt−1
(b)
Figure 2: Return map of the mapping of Eq. (1), for a0 = 5, ∆a = 4, c0 = 1,
∆c = 4, n = 16 and m = 216; (a) s = n = 16; (b) s = 8.
The dynamical variation of coefficients, incrementing their value at each
iteration, acts as a counter, changing permanently the estate of the map,
thus preventing the existence of fixed points or short periods of the generated
sequence. The maximum repetition period of the coefficients is 2n−2 which
is reached when ∆a or ∆c have the least possible common prime factors
with m, what is achieved for ∆amod 8 = ∆cmod 8 = 4 when m = 2n.
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2.1.3 Full Version of the Chaotic Map with Dynamical Variation
of Coefficients and Perturbation of the Least Significant
Bits
With the full version of the mapping defined by Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), the
optimum entropy and security is reached. The range of observed periods
varies between p = 21.5n and p = 22n for different parameters with values
s = n, a0mod 4 = 1, ∆amod 8 = 4, c0mod 4 = 1, and ∆cmod 8 = 4.
Figure. 2 (b) illustrates the return map for the following parameter
values: a0 = 5, c0 = 1, ∆a = 4, ∆c = 4, s = 8, n = 16 and m = 2
16.
Note that this map contains much more points than the one
corresponding to the Fig. 2 (a), because the period of the sequence is much
longer (for clarity only the first N = 4m = 218 points are represented).
The full version of the mapping defined by Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), is
not injective because each element of the domain is mapped to several
elements of its codomain, and each element of the codomain may have several
preimages. Hence it is impossible to invert the mapping.
The number M of different samples in the generated sequence obeys to
the birth day problem formula:
M = m−m
(
m− 1
m
)N
(4)
being N the total number of generated samples. The statistical behavior is
identical to one of a pure random source.
The sequences generated by the full version of the mapping (with a
word size of n = 64 bits) pass successfully the randomness test suites
of the American National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST
SP 800-22 [11], as well as the more stringent Diehard from Marsaglia (1995)
and even the new and yet more stringent Tuftests of Marsaglia and Tsang
of 2002 [12].
It was found that the best values of s to pass the mentioned tests, ranged
from 20 to 44 right-shift places, when a word size of n = 64 bits was used.
A fundamental achievement of this scheme is the correction of the lack of
entropy of the less significant bits of the sequence generated by a sawtooth
piecewise linear map, that is corrected by the bitwise XOR with the most
significant bits.
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2.2 Trident Combined Generator
The full version of the mapping defined by Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), may
constitute itself an excellent random number generator; but there are two
remaining problems to be considered.
The first one is that if the word size used is limited, the maximum period
will be limited and may result too short for certain applications, such as
stream cipher of video signals.
The second problem is that the output generated numbers are the same
that are used to calculate the next sample. An opponent may try to mount
an algebraic attack, that could be feasible if the attacker have access to a
large computer facility.
To avoid these troubles, a joint combination of three individual chaotic
maps, with dynamical variation of coefficients and perturbation of the least
significant bits, named Trident, is proposed. One of the maps to be combined
will remain completely hidden, while the sequences generated by the other
two are combined by the bitwise XOR addition, to form the output of the
joint generator. This architecture is depicted in Fig. 3.
Note that the way of combining the three individual generators is the
chained perturbation of the less significant bits. Instead of perturbing
the less significant bits of each map through the bitwise XOR of the own
right-shifted bits, they are perturbed by the right-shifted bits of the nearby
map in a cyclic chained manner.
In this way, two goals are attained: first, the period of the joint generator
is increased to the least common multiple of the periods of the three
individual generators; second, the analysis of the output sequence is useless
for determining the system parameters.
The equations defining the Trident generator are:
wt = xt ⊕ zt, (5)
xt = (at xt−1 + ct) mod m⊕ ((et zt−1 + ht) mod m)≫ s, (6)
yt = (bt yt−1 + dt) mod m⊕ ((at xt−1 + ct) mod m)≫ s, (7)
zt = (et zt−1 + ht) mod m⊕ ((bt yt−1 + dt) mod m)≫ s, (8)
at = (at−1 +∆a) mod m; ct = (ct−1 +∆c) mod m, (9)
bt = (bt−1 +∆b) mod m; dt = (dt−1 +∆d) mod m, (10)
et = (et−1 +∆e) mod m; ht = (ht−1 +∆h) mod m, (11)
were wt is the output sample of the Trident generator at the moment t;
xt, yt, zt are the output samples of the three generators; at, ct, bt, dt, et, ht
are the correspondent coefficients; and ∆a,∆c,∆b,∆d,∆e,∆h are the
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{ xt } { yt } { zt }
(bt yt-1 + dt )  mod m (et zt-1 + ht )  mod m(at xt-1 + ct )  mod m
>>s >>s
{ wt }
>>s
Figure 3: Trident combined generator.
increments of the respective coefficients. All the coefficients and the
respective increments should be chosen of different values, to warrant that
the sequences generated by each generator are unique.
The Trident generator key is formed by the whole coefficients of the
individual maps. Due to the limitations imposed to the coefficient values
(see Sect. 2.1.3) the number of bits with which the coefficients are coded is
n − 2 and the number of bits with which the increments of the coefficients
are coded is n − 3. If the word size is 64 bits, the total amount of key bits
is 3 × 62 + 3× 61 = 369, considering that all coefficients must be different,
one must accept that the effective number of bits is 368. If one considers
the initial values x0, y0 and z0 as part of the key, we must add 3× 64 = 192
more bits to the key length, hence the total amount of different keys rise
to 2560. As the right-shift value allows for a very small variation, it is not
worth its consideration as part of the key. It is better to fix its value to 32
bits.
The evident form to attack the system is the brute force but the huge
number of different keys prevents such attack. The algebraic attack is
reasonably unlikely due to the impossibility of learning the internal state
of the generator.
Large number of sequences were generated by the Trident combined
generator with a word size of 64 bits, programmed in C99. All of them
passed with success the randomness test suites of the NIST SP 800-22, as
well as the Diehard from Marsaglia (1995) and the Tuftests of Marsaglia
and Tsang of 2002.
The performance of Trident in an Intel Core2 Duo with OS Windows32
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is about one clock cycle/bit. This speed is in the range of the finalists of
the eSTREAM project.
Different versions may be designed using more than three coupled chaotic
maps and perturbed in the same way and different word sizes. For instance,
to compensate the smaller periods attainable with an architecture of only
32 bits, a five chaotic maps can be used, in this way two completely different
sequences, with the same repetition period, could be generated.
3 Conclusion
A fast, cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator, has been
described, based on the combination of three coupled chaotic maps. The
maps are sawtooth piecewise linear maps with dynamical variation of
coefficients and perturbation of the least significant bits. Its output is
unpredictable. The version with a word size of 64 bits has a repetition period
length in excess of 2198 bits. The generated sequence passes successfully the
most stringent randomness test suites. The attained performance is about
one clock cycle per generated bit.
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